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NECESSITY IN A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
PETER W. HOGG*

THE MANITOBA LANGUAGE RIGHTS REFERENCE
The Situation in Manitoba
In Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985),' the Supreme Court of Canada
held that nearly all of the laws of the province of Manitoba were unconstitutional. There was no plausible way of escaping from this alarming conclusion. Section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, which is the constitution of the
province of Manitoba: provided that Manitoba statutes were to be enacted in
both the English and the French languages. In 1890, Manitoba enacted the
Oficial Language Act, which provided that Manitoba statutes need only be
enacted in the English language. In effect, this Act was an attempt to repeal a
constitutional requirement. Not surprisingly, the Act was held to be invalid
by county courts in 1892 and 1909, but these decisions were not appealed,
were not reported, and were completely disregarded by the authorities in
Manitoba. It was not until 1979 that a case in which the Ojicial LanguageAct
was challenged reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Forest case
(1979),3the Court held that the Oficial LanguageAct was invalid by reason of
its conflict with s.23 of the Manitoba Act.
The decision in Forest meant that the Manitoba Legislature had to enact its
statutes in both the English and the French languages. This requirement
applied not only to statutes enacted after the Forest decision, but to statutes
enacted before the decision as well. Manitoba's statutes had been enacted in
English only ever since 1890, when the Ojicial Language Act was passed.
Moreover, Manitoba had not been preparing unofficial French translations of
its statutes. Manitoba was therefore faced with a massive task of translation
and re-enactment. It embarked on this task rather slowly. In 1984, five years
after the Forest decision of 1979, the Legislature was still enacting some
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Formerly Senior
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Lecturer 1966-1 969, Reader 1970-1 971, Monash University.
Part of this article, under the title, "Necessity in Manitoba", was delivered at a conference
on "The Role of Courts in Society" at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1986. The
papers have been published in S. Shetreet (ed.), Role of Courts in Society (Dordrecht,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); my paper appears at pp. 7-24.
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721.
The Manitoba Act, 1870 (Can.) created Manitoba out of a federal territory. Although a
Canadian statute, it comprises part of the "Constitution of Canada" (defined in s.52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982) and can be altered only by the appropriate amending procedures, which in the case of s.23 would require the assent of both the Parliament of
Canada and the Legislature of Manitoba (as stipulated by s.43 of the Constitution Act,
1982).
A.-G. Man. v. Forest [I9791 2 S.C.R. 1032.
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current statutes in English only, and none of the body of statutes enacted
before 1979 had been re-enacted in the required bilingual format.
The Holding of Invalidity
The Forest case had not had to rule on the legal status of the large body of
statutes that had been enacted in English only. This issue arose when a
motorist named Bilodeau, who was charged with the offence of speeding,
defended the charge on the ground that Manitoba's highway speed limits had
been imposed by a statute that was invalid, because the statute had been
enacted in English only. The Manitoba courts managed to reject this d e f e n ~ e , ~
and Bilodeau appealed the case into the Supreme Court of Canada. For
reasons that will be explained later in this article,' Bilodeau's conviction was
eventually affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.6 But Bilodeau was indirectly successful, in substance, in securing the legal ruling that he sought.
When the Bilodeau appeal reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the
federal government (which assumes a protective role towards French-speaking minorities in the English-speaking provinces) became concerned that an
appeal involving only two statutes might not yield a comprehensive ruling on
the validity of Manitoba's statutes. The federal government accordingly
directed a "reference" to the Supreme Court of Canada for an advisory
opinion as to the validity of all of Manitoba's statutes that had been enacted in
English only. (The reference is a procedure available to all Canadian governments to obtain an advisory opinion from the court^.)^ In Re Manitoba
Language Rights (1985),' the Supreme Court of Canada, rejecting the argument advanced by the government of Manitoba that the constitutional
requirement of bilingual enactment was "directory" only,9 held that the
consequence of failure to comply with the constitutional requirement was
invalidity. It followed that all of Manitoba's past and present statute law,
except for those statutes enacted in both languages (all pre-1890 statutes and
some post-1 979 statutes), was invalid.

'

In Bilodeau v. A.-G. Man. 119811 5 W.W.R. 393 (Man. C.A.), the Manitoba Court of
Appeal upheld Bilodeau's conviction. Two of the three judges held that the requirement
of bilingual enactment in s.23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 was "directory" only, so that its
breach did not result in the invalidity of the unilingual statutes. The third judge disagreed
with this reasoning, holding that the requirement was "mandatory", but he agreed with
the result, because he held that the laws enacted prior to the Forest decision were saved
from invalidity by the principle of necessity.
Text accompanying note 29, infra.
Bilodeau v. A.-G. Man. [I9861 1 S.C.R. 449.
The reference procedure, and the decisions upholding its constitutionality, are described
in P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2nd edn, Toronto, Carswell, 1985), 177183.
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721. I disclose that I was one of the counsel for the Attorney General of
Canada.
This was the argument that had persuaded a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal:
note 4, supra.

Necessity in a Constitutional Crisis
The Resulting Vacuum of Law
If the Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference had stopped at the point of its holding of general invalidity, the
consequence would have been a vacuum of law in Manitoba. Under Canada's
federal constitution, the provinces have responsibility for most of the private
law, including contracts, torts, property, commercial law, succession, labour
relations, industrial regulation and consumer protection. In Manitoba, the
laws on all these topics, and many others, if enacted since 1890 in English
only, would be invalid. The provinces also have responsibility for the courts,
municipal institutions, school boards and many other regulatory or public
bodies. In Manitoba, all these bodies, to the extent that they derived their
existence or powers from laws enacted in English only, would be acting
without legal authority.
The Legislature of Manitoba would also be an invalid body. Although the
Legislature was established by the Manitoba Act, 1870 (the constitution), the
structure of the legislative assembly had been radically changed by laws
passed since 1890 in English only: the size of the assembly had been increased
from 24 to 57 members, women had been granted the right to vote and sit in
the assembly, and persons aged 18 to 20 had also been granted the right to
vote. It the laws pertaining to the franchise and the Legislature were invalid,
then Manitoba would lack a Legislature. If this were so, the vacuum of law
could never be filled. Past laws could not be re-enacted in both languages.
Future laws could not be enacted, even in both languages. Even a remedial
constitutional amendment seemed to be unavailable, because the Constitution of Canada stipulates that an amendment affecting only one province
must be agreed to by "resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons
and of the legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment
applies.1° If Manitoba lacked a lawful legislative assembly, it could not pass
the requisite resolution.
There were some common law doctrines that could provide some relief
from the consequences of the invalidity of Manitoba's laws. The de facto
doctrine would sometimes give validity to the acts of a public official with
ostensible (but not legal) authority to perform his duties." The res judicata
doctrine would preclude the re-opening of cases decided by the courts on the
basis of invalid laws.I2 The mistake of law doctrine might preclude the
recovery by taxpayers of taxes paid under an invalid law.I3 The trouble with
these three doctrines is that each is quite limited in its scope or (in the case of
the defacto doctrine especially) quite uncertain in its scope; and, as the Court

lo
'I
I*
l3

Constitution Act, 1982, s.43; cf. note 2, supra.
See C. L. Pannam, "Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto Officers" (1966) 2 F. L. Rev.
37; see also the Court's discussion in [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 755-757.
See G. Spencer Bower and A. K. Turner, Res Judicata (2nd Edn., London, Buttenvorths,
1969).
See J. D. McCamus, "Restitutionary Recovery of Monies Paid to a Public Authority
under aMistake of Law" (1983) 17 U.B.C.L. Rev. 233; P. W .Hogg, Liabilityofthe Crown
(Carswell, 2nd edn, Toronto, 1989), 18 1-1 86.
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acknowledged,I4the doctrines would not cover all of the situations that could
be questioned.
The Supreme Court of Canada's Solution
The Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference
faced an awkward dilemma. On the one hand, the integrity of Canada's
constitution, with its protections for the French-speaking minority, required
the Court to hold that Manitoba statutes enacted only in English were invalid.
On the other hand, the Court could not thrust upon the people of Manitoba
the chaos and disorder that seemed inevitable if the Court were to deny the
efficacy of the legal system that was in fact in place. The solution devised by
the Court was to hold that the Acts of the Legislature that were enacted only in
English were invalid, but to hold as well that the Acts were to be "deemed to
have temporary force and effect for the minimum period . . . necessary for
their translation, re-enactment, printing and publication".15 The latter holding protected the existing body of Manitoba laws, and all things done on the
basis of past laws. Future laws, that is, the laws enacted after the date of the
Court's opinion (June 13, 1985), had to comply with the constitutional requirements and did not benefit from the period of temporary validity.I6
The Court's holding of temporary validity entailed a ruling as to the duration of the minimum period necessary for the translation and re-enactment
of Manitoba's unilingual laws. On this point, although some evidence had
been adduced as to the scope of the task and the resources available to
accomplish it, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient, and that the
Court was incapable of determining the duration of the period of temporary
validity; this issue was accordingly remitted to a special hearing of the Court
to be convened later.17
The special hearing for the determination of the period of temporary validity was held five months later (on November 4,1985) at which the Court, by
consent of the parties,I8 fixed December 31, 1988 as the date by which
Manitoba's consolidated statutes and regulations and rules of court were to be
translated and re-enacted, and December 3 1, 1990 as the date by which all
other laws were to be translated and re-enacted.19 Generally speaking, the
effect of this order was to allow (1) a period of just over three years for the
translation and re-enactment of all of the important current laws, and (2) a
period of just over five years for the translation and re-enactment of less
important current laws (private laws and unconsolidated public laws) and
repealed or spent laws (some at least of which were to be translated and
re-enacted to preclude the re-opening of transactions dependent upon their
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 757.
Id. 782.
l6 Id. 768.
l 7 Id. 769.
l 8 The Court's order was made with the consent of Manitoba, Canada (the government
which had directed the reference), Quebec (which had intervened in the reference), Mr.
Bilodeau (another intervenant) and three organizations of French-speakers (also intervenants).
l 9 Re Manitoba Language Rights: Order [I9851 2 S.C.R. 347.
l4
l5

Necessity in a Constitutional Crisis

257

validity).20In the result, therefore, for several years the people of Manitoba
will be bound by laws that were never constitutionally enacted. The laws
derive their force exclusively from the order of the Supreme Court of
Canada.
The Court's Reliance on the Rule of Law
What is the justification for this radical exercise of power by the Supreme
Court of Canada? The reason offered by the Court for the temporary validation of Manitoba's unilingual statutes was that a legal vacuum in the province would "undermine the principle of the rule of law"." According to the
Court, there were two aspects to the rule of law. First, the rule of law required
that the law be supreme over officials of the government as well as private
individuals." This aspect of the rule of law is of course basic to constitutionalism, justifying courts in restraining arbitrary power by insisting upon fidelity to the constitution and other laws. The second aspect of the rule of law,
which was even more basic than the first, required simply that a community
be governed by law.23In this sense, the rule of law recognized that "[llaw and
order are indispensable elements of civilized life".24
In the Manitoba situation, the two requirements of the rule of law contradicted each other. The first requirement -the supremacy of the law over the
organs of government - entailed that Manitoba's unilingual laws, since they
had not been enacted in compliance with the law of the constitution, be held
invalid. But the effect of such a holding was to deny to Manitoba an operating
legal system in violation of the second reqirement of the rule of law. The
Court's resolution of this conflict was to accord temporary force to the existing body of Manitoba laws until such time as the Manitoba Legislature could
comply with the law of the Constitution.
The Court's decision thus made the concept of the "rule of law", which is
usually a mere rhetorical flourish, the central justification for its preservation
of Manitoba's de facto legal system. The Court claimed that the rule of law
had "constitutional status", because it was referred to in the preamble to one
of the instruments comprising the Constitution of Canada,25and because it
was "implicit in the very nature of a Constituti~n".~~
The Court did not directly rely upon a doctrine of "necessity", although
courts in various parts of the common-law world had invoked such a doctrine
to justify departures from constitutional legality. The Court referred to these

Manitoba proposed to translate all repealed and spent laws back to and including the
1970 revision of the Manitoba Statutes. Perfect safety required the province to go all the
way back to 1890, but such a task was impossible.
[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 748.
22 Ibid.
'3 Id. 749.
24 Ibid.
25 The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1982 states: "Whereas Canada is founded on
principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law:"
26 [I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 750.
20
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cases, but treated them as supplying only "analogous support" for its order.27
These cases are the subject of a later section of this article.
The Bilodeau Case
An ironic consequence of the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in the
Manitoba Language Rights Reference was that it entailed the conviction of
Mr. Bilodeau, the man whose determination and courage28had brought the
issue to the Court. He had been vindicated in his contention that the Englishlanguage statute under which he had been convicted was invalid. But, by
virtue of the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the statute was deemed to
have been in force when Bilodeau committed his offence; therefore, he was
properly convicted under the Act. The Supreme Court of Canada was accordingly obliged to affirm his conviction, and, after a long delay which was
perhaps intended to signal the Court's discomfort, the Court did affirm his
convi~tion.~~
The Mercure Case
One could be forgiven for assuming that the situation in Manitoba was
unique. But it turned out that a similar vacuum of law existed in
Saskatchewan as well. The province of Saskatchewan had been created by
federal statute in 1905.30It had been carved out of the North-West Territories,
which were federal territories governed by the federal parliament and government. In 1877, when the small population of the Territories was half
French-speaking, the federal Parliament enacted a law, similar to s.23 of the
Manitoba Act, 1870, that required the ordinances of the Legislative Assembly
of the Territories to be enacted in both the English and the French languages.
By the time Saskatchewan was created in 1905, the wave of immigration to
the prairies had greatly increased the population, and reduced the proportion
of French-speakers to less than five per cent of the population. (It is about two
per cent today.) The 1877 language law was apparently assumed to be inapplicable in the new province, and from the beginning the Legislature enacted
statutes in English only.
It was not until the 1980s that anyone brought a legal challenge to the
Saskatchewan Legislature's practice of English-only enactment. In R. v. Mercure (1988),31a French-speaking resident of Saskatchewan defended a charge
of speeding on the ground that Saskatchewan's highway legislation had been
invalidly enacted. The case rose to the Supreme Court of Canada, where a
majority held that the 1877 language law was still part of the law of SasId. 758.
Bilodeau's position in the litigation was exceedingly unpopular in Manitoba, and he
received much abuse.
29 Bilodeau v. A.-G.Man. [ I 9861 1 S.C.R. 449. The appeal had been argued at the same time
as the reference (June 1984), but the decison on the appeal was handed down eleven
months after the decision on the reference.
30 Saskatchewan Act, 1905 (Can.). The federal Parliament's power to create new provinces
out of federal territories was conferred by the Constitution Act, 1871 (Imp.), s.4.
31 [I9881 1 S.C.R. 234.
2'

28
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katchewan, and that it prescribed the manner and form of enactment of
statutes by the Legislature. Since all Saskatchewan statutes had been enacted
in English only, which was the wrong manner and form, they were all invalid.
However, the principle of the Manitoba Language Rights Reference applied
here too "to keep the existing laws temporarily in effect for the minimum
period of time necessary for the statutes to be translated, re-enacted, printed
and published in F r e n ~ h " . ~ ~
Mercure thus decided that in Saskatchewan, as in Manitoba, the statute
books were full of invalid statutes. However, the Court noted an important
difference between the two provinces. In the case of Manitoba, the language
requirement was an entrenched part of the constitution of the province,
requiring a constitutional amendment for its repeal or a l t e r a t i ~ nIn
. ~the
~ case
of Saskatchewan, however, the language requirement was not part of the
constitution. As a pre-confederation law, received at the creation of the province, it could be repealed or amended by the Saskatchewan Legislature acting in the correct manner and form, needless to say. The Court actually
suggested this solution in its reasons for judgment: "the legislature may resort
to the obvious, if ironic, expedient of enacting a bilingual statute removing the
restrictions imposed on it by [the 1877 language law] and then declaring all
existing provincial statutes valid notwithstanding that they were enacted,
printed and published in English only".34 To the distress of its Frenchspeaking minority, the government of Saskatchewan took up this suggestion,
and secured the enactment by the Legislature, in both English and French, of a
statute that repealed the two-language requirement for the future and validated all the statutes invalidly enacted in the past.35
The province of Alberta was established at the same time as the province of
Sa~katchewan,~~
and was carved out of the same federal territories. Since
Alberta, like Saskatchewan, had never repealed or amended the 1877 language law, it was clear that the Mercure ruling must apply to Alberta as well.
Therefore, Alberta was also faced with a wholly invalid body of statutes,
although no doubt the statutes were temporarily in effect for the time needed
to translate and re-enact them. Alberta, like Saskatchewan, took the easy
route of enacting, in both languages, a curative statute.37
THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
The American Civil War Cases
In the United States, during the civil war, the Confederate states organized
governments that did not conform to the requirements of the Constitution of
the United States, and of course they waged war against the United States.
32 Id. 280.
33 Note 2, supra.
34 [I9881 1 S.C.R. 234, 280-281.
35 The Language Act, Stats. Sask. 1988, c. L-6.1.
36 Alberta Act, 1905 (Can.).
37 Languages Act, Stats. Alta. 1988, c. L-7.5.
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After the war came to an end in 1865,the question arose whether the laws and
acts of the Confederate state legislatures and governments were legally effective. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the doctrine of
necessity sustained these laws and acts, except those that were directed to the
prosecution of the war against the United States. On this basis, the Court
upheld a law incorporating an insurance company and a law authorizing
trustees to invest in confederate bonds.38In comparing these cases with the
Manitoba Language Rights Refeence, it is interesting to notice that the
Supreme Court of the United States did not give merely temporary effect to
the Confederate laws, but accepted them as wholly valid.
The Pakistan Case
The doctrine of necessity was next applied in Pakistan. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 (U.K.) partitioned the Indian subcontinent and created
the new Dominions of India and Pakistan. This Act was the original constitution of both countries, but the Act provided for a Constituent Assembly in
each country, with power to enact new constitutional laws that would replace
the provisions of the Act. In Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly met for
seven years, during which time it enacted forty-four constitutional laws.
However, because the Constituent Assembly wanted the new constitution to
be "autochthonous", the Assembly deliberately omitted one of the formalities
stipulated by the Indian Independence Act for the passage of constitutional
laws, namely, the assent of the Governor General of P a k i ~ t a n Unfortu.~~
nately for autochthony, the Federal Court of Pakistan held that the assent of
the Governor General was an essential requirement, and that its absence
rendered void all of the constitutional laws enacted by the Constituent As~embly.~'
The Court also held that the omission could not now be repaired by
the Governor General: an attempt by the Governor General to confer his
assent retroactively on the laws enacted over the seven-yearperiod was held to
be legally ineffe~tive.~'
The invalidity of the constituent process in Pakistan meant that not only
were the forty-four constitutional laws invalid, but a great many laws and
institutions that had been enacted or established under the invalid constitutional laws were also invalid. Faced with this situation, the Governor General
issued a proclamation temporarily validating the forty-four invalid constitutional laws and everything done under those laws. This proclamation was to
The leading cases are Texas v. White 74 U.S. 700 (1868) (Texas law facilitating bond
transfer invalid, because purpose to raise funds for war against U.S.); Horn v. Lockhart 84
U.S. 570 (1873) (Alabama probate court decree directing investment of estate funds in
state bonds invalid, because bonds issued to raise funds for war against U.S.); United
States v. Home and Southern Insurance Companies 89 U.S. 99 (1875) (Georgia laws
incorporating insurance companies upheld); Baldy v. Hunter 17 1 U.S. 388 (1 898) (Georgia law authorizing trustees to invest estate funds in state bonds upheld).
39 Autochthony requires that a constitution be indigenous. The idea was that, by omitting
one of the formalities stipulated by the Indian Independence Act, the Constituent Assembly's work would not derive its authority from the former colonial power, but from
events solely within Pakistan.
40 Federation ofPakistan v. Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 306.
41 UsifPatel v. The Crown, P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 576.
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remain in force only until the laws had been re-enacted or replaced by a new
Constituent Assembly (which would include the assent of the Governor
General). The Governor General's proclamation was not authorized by the
express terms of the Indian Independence Act. Nevertheless, in Special Reference No. 1 of 1955 (1956),42the proclamation was upheld by a majority of the
Federal Court of Pakistan, relying on the doctrine of necessity. This case is
unlike both the Manitoba case and the American civil war cases in that the
Pakistan Court did not have to fashion a remedy of its own, but simply rule on
the efficacy of the remedy fashioned and applied by the Governor General.
The Cyprus Case
The doctrine of necessity was next applied in Cyprus. The Constitution of
Cyprus, which dated from 1960, when Cyprus achieved independence from
the United Kingdom, established a diarchical form of government, with
elaborate provisions for the sharing of power between the Greek majority and
the Turkish minority. In particular, the constitution made provision for
"mixed" courts (with judges from both communities) to try certain criminal
cases, for a Supreme Constitutional Court (also with judges from both communities) to decide constitutional questions, and for the enactment of laws in
both languages. These "basic articles" of the constitution were expressly
declared to be unalterable by any means whatever.
In 1963, there was an armed insurgency by Turkish Cypriots, who secured
control over those parts of Cyprus occupied by the Turkish community, and
who stopped the participation by Turkish Cypriots in the mixed courts, the
Supreme Constitutional Court and the Parliament and government. The
Parliament of Cyprus (without its Turkish Cypriot members) purported to
enact a law, in the Greek language only, that (1) abolished the constitutional
requirements of mixed courts for the duration of the emergency; and (2)
conferred on the Court of Appeal the jurisdiction vested by the constitution in
the Supreme Constitutional Court.
In Attorney General of Cyprus v. Mustafa Ibrahim (1964),43the Court of
Appeal of Cyprus upheld the emergency law on the basis of the doctrine of
necessity: in time of emergency, the express terms of the constitution could be
overridden to secure the continued functioning of the courts. Of the three
opinions written in the Court of Appeal, Josephides J. provided the clearest
statement of the doctrine of necessity. He said that the doctrine was an
"implied exception" to the express terms of the constitution, and that its
purpose was "to ensure the very existence of the State".44It became applicable
when the following prerequisites were satisfied:
"(a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional circumstances;
(b) no other remedy to apply;
(c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity; and
P.L.R. 1956 W.P. 598.
119641 Cyprus L.R.195.
44 Id. 265.
42

43
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(d) it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the
exceptional circum~tances."~~
When these prerequisites were satisfied, the doctrine of necessity authorized
the Parliament "to deviate from the letter of the constitution, which had been
rendered inoperative by the force of events."46
The Cyprus case is like the Pakistan case, and unlike the Manitoba case and
the American civil war cases, in that the Cypriot Court was not the author of
the measures necessary to preserve the legal order. The Court's role was
confined to upholding a measure promulgated by another institution of
government, in this case, the Parliament of Cyprus.
The Southern Rhodesia Case
The remaining precedent for the existence of a doctrine of necessity arose
out of Southern Rhodesia. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke (1969),47an
appeal to the Privy Council from Southern Rhodesia, the question arose
whether a person had been validly detained under legislation purportedly
enacted by the legislature of Southern Rhodesia after the white minority
government's "unilateral declaration of independence" from Britain in 1965.
The Privy Council held unanimously that the breakaway government had not
become the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia (as would be the case
after a successful r e b e l l i ~ n )because
,~~
Britain was still claiming to be the
lawful government and was taking steps to retain control. The question then
arose whether a law of the unconstitutional legislature could nevertheless be
treated as effective under the doctrine of necessity. On this point, the Privy
Council divided. Lord Reid for the majority refused to uphold the detention
law under the doctrine of necessity. He pointed out that the Parliament of the
United Kingdom had enacted laws for Southern Rhodesia after the unilateral
declaration of independence, and he concluded that "there is no legal vacuum
in Southern Rh~desia".~'LordPearce for the minority would have upheld the
detention law on the basis of necessity. He pointed out that the lawful
government, the government of the United Kingdom, while it was asserting
its authority from afar, was not actually collecting taxes, operating the police,
the courts, or municipal institutions or attending to any of the day-to-day requirements of government. In his view, the principle of necessity required
that the acts of the illegal government be held effective in order to avoid "a
vacuum and chaos".50
In Madzimbamuto, the doctrine of necessity was not applied, because of
Lord Reid's majority view that there was no vacuum of law in Southern
Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence. But the avail-

Ibid.
Id. 267.
[1969] 1 A.C. 645.
48 See S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (4th edn, Penguin, 1981),
74-78.
49 [1969] 1 A.C. 645, 729.
50 Id. 740.
45
46
47
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ability of the doctrine to fill a vacuum of law was assumed by Lord Reid for
the majority as well as by Lord Pearce for the minority.
NECESSITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
In the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, the Court referred to the
necessity cases that have just been described, but the Court did not directly
rely upon them, treating them as providing "analogous support" for the
Court's rule-of-law rea~oning.~'
It seems obvious that the decision could as
easily have been framed in terms of necessity as of rule of law. Indeed, at one
point the Court said that "the Province of Manitoba is in a state of emerge n ~ y " '~ language of a kind to be found in the necessity cases.
The Manitoba case, the civil war cases, the Pakistan case, the Cyprus case
and the Southern Rhodesia case each arose out of a unique circumstance. The
cases differ in the conditions that gave rise to the breach of the constitution. In
two of the cases - Manitoba and Pakistan
the breach of the constitution
was a more or less deliberate act (or omission) in peacetime, while in the other
three situations the breach was caused by conditions of insurgency (falling
short of a successful revolution). The cases also differ in the degree to which
institutions other than the courts had attempted to repair the breach. In
Pakistan, the Governor General had acted to preserve the invalid laws. In
Cyprus, the legislature had acted. In those cases, the courts were essentially
invited to ratify remedial measures designed by other organs of government.
In the other cases, no steps had been taken to repair the constitutional breach,
and the courts were invited to fashion directly a remedial measure, namely, a
declaration that the de facto legal order was effective.
Despite the factual differences, there is a common element in all these
cases: a constitutional breach has occurred (for whatever reason) that cannot
be quickly repaired and that is so radical that, if not condoned, it would cause
a breakdown in the legal order. The doctrine of necessity, or (according to the
Canadian Court) the rule of law, provides relief against the breakdown of the
legal order, at least until such time as the constitutional breach can be properly repaired.53
What the Supreme Court of Canada did in the Manitoba Language Rights
Reference was an extraordinary exercise of the judicial power: a large body of
law, all enacted in breach of the constitution, was maintained in force on
terms stipulated by the Court. It is appropriate to note, however, that the
Court, like its counterparts in the United States, Pakistan and Cyprus did not
have much choice. The alternative was (in the words of Josephides J. in the
Cyprus case)54"to cross its arms and do nothing" and witness "the paralysis"
of the legal order. No other authority appeared to have any power to remedy

-

[I9851 1 S.C.R. 721, 758.
Id. 766.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the American civil war cases did not make its
ruling temporary so as to require the lawful post-civil-war legislatures to ratify (or repudiate) the things done by the unlawful legislatures and governments.
54 [I9641 Cyprus L. R. 195, 267-268.
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the situation in Manitoba, and if some other means was attempted, perhaps
through federal legislation, the other solution would inevitably wind up in
front of the Court for a ruling as to its validity. The Court no doubt considered
that it might as well decide the issue immediately, and the only conceivable
disposition involved the preservation of Manitoba's legal order. By making
the preservation order temporary, the Court affirmed an ultimate duty of
fidelity to the letter of the constitution, and vindicated the rights of Manitoba's French-speaking minority.

